Red-Light and Speeding Cameras
Torin Monahan
Red-light and speeding camera systems automate some of the traffic enforcement functions of police. The technologies can include radar or laser detection devices, electromagnetic loops embedded in the road, pole-mounted or portable cameras, microprocessors, and networking devices. Most of the older systems rely upon 35 mm film, which must be routinely extracted from the units, while the newer systems employ digital and video cameras and send the information over data networks. In theory, when a vehicle trips an electronic sensor after a traffic light changes red (or when a vehicle’s speed exceeds the posted limit by a certain amount, usually by 10mph in the U.S.), photographs are taken of the front and rear of the vehicle, or of the driver and the license plate, respectively. Then, the owner of the vehicle can be sent a citation or a notice to “nominate” the actual driver of the vehicle at the time of the alleged violation. Currently, forty-five countries utilize such systems, and in the U.S. the systems are deployed in 19 states and the District of Columbia.
Privacy advocates and others have vocally opposed such systems. The key concerns have to do with the potential for surveillance creep, the attenuation of constitutionally guaranteed due process and equal protection, and the apparent conflicts of interest and lack of transparency with the outsourcing of police functions to private industries. First, surveillance creep is a serious concern with technological systems such as these, because they afford the indefinite retention of data, making it possible – and likely attractive – for law enforcement agencies and others to access the data for purposes that exceed the originally intended functions of the systems. It is also possible that unintended breaches of privacy can occur, such as a well documented case in Hawthorne, California, where a picture of a woman and her lover was sent – in the form of a citation – to the woman’s husband. Second, due process and equal protection clauses of the U.S. constitution may be conveniently ignored by police departments and the courts who perceive the technological systems as somehow “neutral” and therefore more fair than individual law enforcement agents in their targeting of traffic crimes. However, compelling cases have been made that significant constitutional violations are occurring, because not everyone is being photographed, because punishments can vary depending on whether one is cited by an officer or by the automated system, because data unrelated to the violation are being collected and stored, and because those being accused of breaking the law have no recourse to challenge their accusers in court, meaning – in effect – that they are guilty until proven innocent. Finally, the privatization of police functions has introduced a host of secondary concerns about the profit interests and secrecy of the companies operating these systems. Notably, a judge in San Diego, California found that the evidence generated by these systems was unreliable because the private company operating them received a percentage of the fines and evidently “rigged” the system to increase its profits. What this example demonstrates is that far from being neutral, the technologies are embedded with the values and interests of their designers, who in most cases are private companies that have no obligations of public accountability.
As might be expected, individuals have developed vibrant “counter-surveillance” techniques to neutralize the effectiveness of red-light and speeding camera systems. These include extreme measures such as destroying cameras; various sprays, shields, or automated camera flash guns to make license plates illegible; or Global Positioning Systems (GPS), radar or laser detectors, or maps of camera locations to facilitate avoidance of or behavior modification around known cameras.
